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Introduction 
Dissertation Abstract: The effects of public policies on the welfare of different groups in 
society are in many cases unclear. Economists often study such effects through welfare analyses based 
on a mathematical model of an individual decision maker. I show for the case of Rational Addiction 
theory that we have both theoretical and empirical reasons to think that the model fails to reflect the 
welfare of real people. I argue that the acceptance and standing of the theory is due to a failure to apply 
relevant criteria when evaluating such welfare analyses, that this failure makes the profession take 
absurd theories seriously, and that such welfare analyses should therefore be treated with scepticism 
and great care. 
Do public pension schemes and unemployment insurance raise people’s 
welfare above what it would otherwise have been? Are smokers made better off by 
cigarette taxes that reduce their smoking and future health problems? Is advertising a 
good or a bad? Public policy on a variety of issues influences the welfare of real 
people, but the effects such policies have on various groups are in many cases matters 
of dispute. Economists often study such effects by constructing a mathematical model 
of an individual decision maker and calculating the welfare effect of various policies 
within this theoretical model. In the following dissertation I argue that – as currently 
used by many economists – this method is a highly unreliable way of supporting and 
justifying claims about the welfare of real people. 
In evaluating the use of choice theory for welfare analysis, I believe we need 
to distinguish between cases where choice theory is used to summarise intuitions 
concerning welfare effects and those where it is used to justify claims concerning 
welfare effects.  
Most people would agree that there are cases where a person’s choice reflects 
what is good for him or her, for instance in everyday situations concerning household 
goods.
i Based on such beliefs, it is relatively unproblematic to state that people are 
better off if they are given a choice between a wider range of household goods, if their 
real income is increased so they can purchase more goods, etc. In such cases, the 
economist’s utility-maximising toy-person could be said to provide a summary of 
intuitions or beliefs shared by many concerning welfare and consumption. Such cases 
of choice theory used for welfare analysis are relatively unproblematic, as long as we 
keep in mind that such choice theories do not establish how people’s welfare changes,   8
but rather state how many already believe people’s welfare would change if 
consumption opportunities shifted in some specified way.  
The case where choice theory is used to establish claims concerning people’s 
welfare is more troublesome. We then need to know why and when and to what extent 
this method should be seen as trustworthy and valid. Put differently, we need reasons 
to suppose that the welfare of the utility maximising toy person reflects the welfare of 
real people. The question is how we can evaluate this. 
Friedman 1953 – perhaps the most famous methodological essay in economics 
– has been read as suggesting that the goal of economics should be to achieve 
measurable aims such as prediction. The specific theoretical assumptions and 
constructs employed are then irrelevant for evaluating your theory, all that matters is 
your measurable success in achieving good predictions: It is sufficient that the real 
world behaves “as-if” your theory was correct.
 ii While such theories may have their 
uses, they are insufficient for someone doing welfare analysis. For welfare analysis, 
the theoretical toy person needs to be more than just a cog in a prediction generating 
machine. The toy person also needs to accurately represent the welfare of real people. 
To establish this it will clearly be insufficient to show predictive success, especially 
since we can make our utility maximising toy person reproduce people’s behaviour 
patterns no matter what these behaviour patterns are. Provided the patterns remain 
stable, our toy person will then “predict” observations no matter how well or poorly 
he represents the predicted person’s welfare. 
In practise, most economists interested in welfare analysis would agree that 
predictive accuracy is insufficient, and at seminars and in their referee comments 
assumptions are frequently discussed: Are they compatible with standard rationality 
assumptions? Do the results of the model rely on restrictive assumptions of 
complementarity between good X and good Y? Would the conclusions change if there 
was uncertainty in the model? And so on. This shows that you do not have 
unrestricted freedom when making assumptions. Instead, it seems as though there is 
an unwritten rule that some assumptions are immune to empirical evidence and can 
only be challenged using purely theoretical criteria of elegance, mathematical 
tractability, compatibility with already existing literature, solvability, etc. In this way, 
it seems to me that choice theories have been allowed to evolve away from anything 
that could accurately represent the kind of decision problems that real people are face   9
and solve. In particular, choice theories used for welfare analysis are now allowed to 
involve assumptions of precise, correct and quantitative beliefs, full awareness of the 
preferences you would have in all possible contexts and a God-like ability to make 
long range, intricate plans exploiting all trade-offs across goods, time and uncertainty. 
These assumptions seem to conflict with empirical evidence from, for instance, the 
field of “behavioural decision theory.” Researchers, of which the most well known are 
the pioneer team of Kahneman and Tversky, have here documented a number of what 
seems like “cognitive anomalies” (see McFadden 1999 for an overview and further 
references). These can, of course, be “explained away” in a variety of ways (see the 
last ten pages of Rabin 2002 for a humorous discussion of this), and economists who 
“only want to predict” may feel that psychological “realism” is unnecessary if they 
predict well without it. For this reason, I have chosen to focus on welfare analysis, 
because this is a subject where these issues cannot be easily explained away or 
avoided: It is economists who are making the claim that their choice theories give 
valid welfare results, and that puts the burden on their shoulders to either provide 
grounds for believing that their specified decision problems are “close enough” to 
those faced by real people for the welfare results to be valid, or to provide grounds for 
believing that a wildly inaccurately specified decision problem can still provide valid 
results. 
My account of how and why choice theories evolved to their present form may 
well be wrong. That is of little importance since my goal is not to write a historical 
narrative identifying “villains” and “heroes” or “crucial wrong turns,” if indeed there 
are any such. My main goal is to argue that as they are currently used for welfare 
analysis, choice theories in economics are so insulated from relevant empirical 
evidence that clearly absurd theories are taken seriously by the profession. In making 
this argument, I am not saying that all use of choice theories for welfare analysis is 
wrong. I am saying that the economics community is, today, in practise, unable to 
weed out invalid and clearly inappropriate uses of choice theory for welfare analysis. 
The sample of theories I have concentrated on is probably not representative, but it 
seems to me that the signal-to-noise or sense-to-nonsense ratio of welfare economics 
is distressingly low. The fact that some result or theory is accepted within the 
economics profession is not in itself – in my experience – a strong indication that this 
result or theory provides well-justified claims about the real world. In particular, my   10
scepticism is high when the decision problems specified concern intricate, detailed 
long-term plans, incentives caused by complex, elaborate and casually documented 
causal chains, accurate estimates and valid reasoning concerning risk and uncertainty, 
and so on. In other words: The claim that an economist’s toy person reflects the 
welfare of real people requires more support and justification the more 
psychologically “unrealistic” and alien the economist has made his toy person.  
To establish my case that economics fails to weed out clearly inappropriate 
uses of choice theory for welfare analysis, I need an example of a theory that has been 
taken far more seriously than it deserves. The theory I have used for this purpose is 
the theory of rational addiction. I would hazard the guess that only a minority would 
initially agree to Nobel Laureate Gary Becker’s statement “that even extreme forms of 
addictive behavior, such as heavy smoking or drinking, involve forward-looking, 
consistent utility maximization [...]” (Becker 1996, 11). Yet, since economists claim 
support from “economic theory” for such beliefs, these beliefs seem more “scientific” 
or “supported” or “justified” than the welfare intuitions of others. After all, the 
“rational addict” belief seems to be based on mathematically sophisticated, peer-
reviewed scientific theories that have become standard tools in the discipline of 
economics and are regularly published in leading economic journals. This gives such 
claims a weight out of proportion to the justification offered.  
My dissertation argues for a conclusion that – to my mind – seems correct but 
rather obvious: Rational choice theories as they are currently used do not provide 
well-justified claims about the welfare or motivation of real world people, despite the 
many claims to the contrary. While I feel reasonably secure in this conclusion, I do 
not pretend to have “the” answer to how such claims should or can be justified. On 
the one hand, I do not believe it is necessary to have the correct answer in order to 
criticise a wrong one. If our present tools do not work, why should we use them just 
because we lack better ones? Wasting resources by straining to achieve a goal with 
useless means is not a sensible activity. On the other hand, I am not a “nihilist” 
arguing that individual decision making and individual welfare are impossible to 
study. My point, as noted above, is more that economists cannot grant their theories 
immunity from empirical research if they want us to believe the implications they 
draw from these theories. Provided such “challenges” from empirical work are faced, 
I think a lot of interesting work can be done both on individual decision making and   11
individual welfare. While I am not familiar enough with other approaches to believe 
that I can pass any general verdict, my impression is that there is a lot of interesting, 
well-supported research on such topics already, both from the already mentioned 
behavioral decision theory and happiness research, and from various forms of 
psychology such as those popularised in Pinker [1997] 1999, Cialdini 1993, 
Gigerenzer 2000, Dawes 1996, Dörner 1989 or Norman [1988] 2002.  
My briefest attempt to argue that rational choice theory is an insufficient basis 
for welfare theory is through parody:  
“My rational toy person, constructed ad-hoc by me in my office based on rough 
generalisations and bizarre claims about human motivation and reasoning, would receive a 
higher utility if allowed to maim himself with knives. Ergo, I should not be disturbed by the 
suicidal behaviour of my son.” (Rogeberg and Nordberg 2003) 
In this dissertation I attempt to support the claim more extensively by using 
two lines of arguments: 
  External criticism:  
  Essay 1. Economists accept rational choice theories that can not be 
taken seriously as possibly true theories involving realist claims that 
provide valid explanations and a basis for welfare analysis. A case that 
illustrates this is rational addiction theories which, judged in this 
regard, are absurd, poorly interpreted and weakly justified. 
  Internal criticism: 
  Essay 2 and 3. Even if one accepts – for the sake of argument – the 
validity of choice frameworks such as extended utility approach of 
Gary Becker, there may be good reasons from “within” to question the 
real world relevance of the welfare analysis that results. One reason is 
that the theories usually fail to distinguish between the anticipation of 
the future and the realisation of the future. A second reason is that 
there are alternative choice frameworks that can generate the same 
behaviours from different assumptions that imply different welfare 
conclusions. A third reason is that beliefs may match and mismatch 
with the world external to the agent in a way that traps the agent in 
belief sets leading to possibly severely suboptimal actions.    12
 Essay 1. Taking Absurd Theories Seriously: Economics and the Case of 
Rational Addiction Theories  
Accepted for publication by “Philosophy of Science,” Forthcoming 
In order to be interesting, academic work usually has to state something that is 
not already the consensus opinion. Crudely put, you either show that something 
people think is smart is stupid, or that something people think is stupid is smart.  
Rational addiction theories try to show how a behaviour pattern almost 
everyone sees as stupid is actually so smart most people do not even begin to 
understand how smart it is. The theories were well received by the discipline, and 
became “one of the standard tools in the economic analysis of the markets for drugs, 
alcohol, tobacco and other potentially addictive goods” (Ferguson 2000, 587). Their 
welfare implications were presented and discussed (e.g. Becker and Murphy 1988; 
Orphanides and Zervos 1995), altered by others (see for instance Gruber and Köszegi 
2001 and Laux 2000), and used in discussions of what real world tobacco taxes 
should be  (e.g. Gruber 2001), while the logic and rationality required by rational 
addicts was analysed philosophically (e.g. Elster 1997) and tested for empirically (see 
Chaloupka and Warner 2000 for references). 
Essay 1 in this dissertation tries to show how this method for studying human 
welfare - which some economists apparently think is smart  - is actually so stupid that 
most economists do not even begin to understand how stupid it is. Since rational 
addiction theories claim to explain real people and provide a valid basis for welfare 
analysis, the authors cannot claim that the theories are just a way of capturing stylised 
or other facts in an as-if theory.  Their explanatory concepts need to be more than just 
useful fictions for summarising observations. Given this: 
a)  if choices are made consciously, the assumptions made and the explanation 
offered by rational addiction theories are neither adequately supported nor 
compatible with evidence, while  
b)  if choices are not made consciously, there is no valid source known for the 
assumptions made and no reason to care about the welfare results. 
This essay also tries to address why rational addiction theories seem both 
relevant and supported to (at least some) economists. It suggests that this is because 
the most clearly unreasonable parts of the explanation remain exclusively in the   13
mathematical model, while the theory is interpreted in a loose story-telling manner 
that triggers feelings of insight and understanding. Finally, it notes the possibility that 
no one really believes these theories to be true. It could be that everyone just pretends 
to take them seriously as part of an intellectual game. At the time, I felt that this 
suggestion was extreme in some way and that writing it violated some rule of “the 
game,” but I have since found it mirrored in quotes from other economists. Robert 
Clower has written that "[m]uch economics is so far removed  from anything that 
remotely resembles the real world that it is often  difficult to take the subject 
seriously,” while Mark Blaug has stated that "[m]odern economics is sick; economics 
has increasingly become an  intellectual game played for its own sake and not for its 
practical consequences" (both quotes collected in Frey 2002).  
Essay 2. Preferences, Rationality and Welfare in Becker’s Extended Utility 
Approach 
Published in “Rationality and Society,” Vol. 15(3): 282-323 
If one remains unpersuaded by the arguments in Essay 1, does that force one 
to accept the welfare analysis that comes from theories such as those of rational 
addiction? Having tried out arguments from Essay 1 in various contexts without 
convincing a lot of economists, I see little reason to believe that many economists will 
change their minds concerning these theories as a result of Essay 1. After all: Such 
theories would not have survived for as long as they have unless they had evolved 
various defence mechanisms against such arguments. While the defences I have 
encountered seem unsatisfactory, this is not the place to discuss them in detail.
iii Even 
if choice frameworks are held to be valid for welfare analysis, however, they would 
not be valid unless used for this purpose in a logical manner that makes sense within 
the choice framework itself. Essay 2 tries to reason through various aspects of 
Becker’s extended utility framework and argues that this is not currently the case. 
Becker’s framework is probably the currently most used choice framework for 
modelling and doing welfare analysis in a way that allows for social interaction, 
changes in tastes, habits, and time preferences, and “seemingly” irrational or non-
optimal choices. Essay 2 argues that even if the framework should be correct, the way 
it is currently used for welfare analysis is not.    14
The main critic of Becker’s approach in the past has been philosopher Jon 
Elster, who argues that Becker’s framework is bad rational choice theory and should 
be rejected on that basis (quotes and references in Essay 2). Essay 2 discusses Elster’s 
arguments and claims that Elster is mistaken: Becker’s framework can be “good” 
rational choice theory (i.e. coherent, consistent, etc.), but even good rational choice 
theory does not provide justified claims about the welfare of real people. It concludes 
by suggesting that Becker’s framework could be seen more as an argument against 
doing welfare analyses with choice theories than as a good (or poor) way of doing it. 
In our present context, the essay’s main claims are that theories within the 
framework 
  rest on faith, in that they 
o  derive their conclusions from assumptions about the world that 
are impossible to check 
o  are flexible to the point where anything can be explained as 
rational 
o  belong to one of a class of frameworks all equally untestable 
and flexible, yet with differing welfare implications  
  are misused, in that they 
o  involve a distinction between two types of time. On the one 
hand, there is time in the individual’s mind as he thinks about the future 
when making his plans. On the other hand, there is time in the individual’s 
life as he actually ages. Typically, these two are not distinguished in 
welfare analysis.  
o  The implication of this is that such theories do not currently say 
anything about the welfare the agent will actually experience, only about 
the welfare he or she experiences from the act of planning itself at the 
moment of choice. As a result of not treating the two ways time enter 
separately, we get welfare analyses that are false even if we accept the 
framework as true.    15
Essay 3: Rationality Traps 
In Submission 
This final essay expands on an idea from essay 2, where I briefly discuss what 
I call the “extended extended utility approach.” In one sense, it is a further implication 
of the two types of time: The time we include in the decision problem is the time in 
the agent’s mind as she makes her plans. Unless she is omniscient and knows the true 
model of her world, this planned life is not identical to what will actually occur. The 
world as it is modelled and appears in the decision problem is only the agent’s beliefs. 
Put differently: In most choice theories of the kind under consideration, the agent’s 
actual world is never considered, and her actual life is therefore never “predicted.” 
Taking the world external to the agent, her rationality and her preferences as 
given, we can see beliefs as determining beliefs in a “feedback-loop.” Beliefs 
determine what the agent rationally chooses, what the agent rationally chooses 
determines what the agent does, what the agent does determines what happens, what 
happens determines what she experiences, and what she experiences determines how 
she updates her beliefs. I argue that this raises the possibility of rationality traps. 
These are feedback loops such that the agent’s beliefs seem correct or unproblematic 
representations of the world, while they actually lead to, possibly severely, 
suboptimal outcomes. This means that even if everyone is rational, and even if we 
disregard the problems discussed in essay 2, the straightforward welfare conclusions 
of rational choice theories such as those of rational addiction still do not follow.  
Two caveats 
Note that, while I argue against using rational choice theory to examine 
people’s welfare or reasons for doing what they do, I do not deny that these theories 
may have other values, both aesthetic and practical. When I first heard the reasoning 
behind Becker’s rotten kid theorem, human capital theory, his theory of crime or 
some of the results from his theory of marriage, I was thrilled intellectually and found 
them fun and entertaining. Saying that a hammer is not suited for brain surgery clearly 
does not deny that it can be useful for driving in nails. 
Also: I certainly would not wish to be misread as claiming that the theorists 
discussed above are stupid in any way. The creativity, talent, perseverance and hard 
work displayed by Gary Becker through his career, for instance, is outstanding by any   16
standard. These theorists are outstanding craftsmen of economic theory. They at times 
accept a widespread practise in academic economics that I find absurd, but their skill 
and excellence in constructing hammers is not lessened by their sometime statements 
that hammers can be profitably used on brains.     17
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i Though there are those who would dispute this too, claiming that people are misguided, influenced by 
peer pressure, manipulated by advertising, caught on a hedonic treadmill, etc., and that people could 
actually achieve higher welfare within the constraints they face by living simpler, changing their 
values, etc.. A well written and interesting example of such an argument based on psychological theory 
and written by an economist is Scitovsky [1976] 1992. A different example of how even “common 
sense” intuitions such as “more income makes you better off” may be misleading or at least incomplete 
comes from “happiness research” which studies how self-reported happiness or satisfaction with one’s 
life correlates and is influenced by various factors. In a recent article, Frey and Stutzer 2002 note that 
“Several scholars [...] have identified a striking and curious relationship: per-capita income in western 
countries [...] has risen sharply in recent decades, whereas average happiness has stayed “virtually 
constant” or has even declined over the same period” (p. 413). 
ii Many would dispute this reading while agreeing that it is common. E.g. “Friedman’s argument that 
hypotheses do not require realistic assumptions has been treated as a carte blanche for making whatever 
assumptions provide a tractable model” (Mayer 1993, 51), which Mayer calls a “misreading.” 
iii Briefly put, they seem to me as if they often involve inconsistent terminology, switching back and 
forth between the “official” definition of something, and the implicit definition required to make sense 
of actual practise. E.g.:  
 
Utility function as a mathematical summary of a consistent preference relation that merely describes 
what a person would be observed to choose given a choice between various alternatives  
(“this involves no restrictions on what a person is motivated by”) 
Vs. 
utility function as a measure of “welfare,” happiness, etc  
(“behaviour motivated by moral concerns is not standard theory”). 
 
Rationality as consistency at a point in time  
(reflexive, transitive and complete preferences) 
vs. 
rationality as a claim concerning aims, thought processes etc  
(“is it rational to vote when there is almost no probability that this will have an impact?”  “Is it rational 
to use drugs?”). 
 
Choice theory as tool for prediction  
(“purely an as-if theory”) 
Vs. 
choice theory as a theory of human psychology  
(“this gives important insights into addictive behaviour.”). 
 
A different way of phrasing much the same point is that economists confuse the limited and 
specific meaning a technical term has within a formal theory  (e.g. uncertainty, addiction, belief, regret) 
with their everyday counterpart. For instance: Early on I heard more than one economist claim 
something along the lines that the criticism in my Essay 1 “is really just a criticism of the fact that 
Becker and Murphy have a full certainty model. Orphanides and Zervos, however, derive the same 
results in a world with uncertainty.” Introducing one single parameter about which agents are 
uncertain, in other words, was taken to mean that we were back in the real world. Essay 1 
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